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Abstract
Using an unbalanced annual dataset from 63 countries over 1998-
2002, we show that improvements in equality and rule of law in devel-
oping countries encourage cadaveric kidney transplants. Religion also
plays an important role in that relationship.
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1 Introduction
Improvements in surgical technology and transplant immunology have lead
to long waiting lists for cadaveric and live kidneys since the second part of
the 1970s. Unfortunately, live kidney donors may not always donate their
organ to the intended patient because of blood type and/or immunological
incompatibilities. Also an upper limit on the number of cadaveric transplants
is set by the number of brain-dead organ donors.1 Yet, increases in cadaveric
kidney harvesting can keep the the waiting list under control.
In this paper, we examine the role of institutions, inequality and religion
on cadaveric versus total kidney transplants using information on 5 year av-
erages obtained from 63 countries over 1998–2002. To gauge the robustness
of our findings and to guard against potential misspecification of our model,
we employ per capita total, private and public medical expenses. We partic-
ularly find for developing countries that improvements in equality and rule
of law encourage the cadaveric to total kidney transplant ratio. Religion also
plays an important role in that relationship.
Section 2 lays out the background information and our hypothesis. Sec-
tion 3 presents our data and empirical findings. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 Background
Currently there is no established and effective organ market system with
desirable properties2 than the unregulated and informal system which is in
place in some countries. However, for reasons that will be clear below, the
medical community worldwide is firmly against the purchase and sale of
organs, and the principles laid down by the international bodies have made
their way into national law. Yet, despite the existence of such laws, brokers
can generally tease the poor to donate their kidneys in return for some cash as
low as $1000.3 Bardhan (2005) indicates that this may be a special problem in
1In the U.S., the upper limit for cadaveric kidneys is between around 14,000-15,000
(Sheehy et al., 2003).
2Roth, Sonmez and Unver (2005) suggest a centralized clearinghouse to establish a
sufficiently thick market so that double and triple coincidences of wants—incompatible
patient-donor pairs exchanging kidneys with other such pairs—can be identified and car-
ried out.
3Only in Iran and the Philippines kidney sales are legal. The Philippines allows resi-
dents to sell a kidney to a countryman if no broker is involved (Jimenez and Bell, 2001).
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poor countries where public information is weak, many people are uneducated
and superstitious, and there is a surfeit of touts, middlemen and operators
trying to manipulate the potential donor to make hasty uninformed decisions.
Here, it seems taking out certain options from the choice set might be a good
idea.
2.1 Lack of Enforcement and Inequality
Enforcement in developing countries has been weak and misplaced due to the
presence of a big gulf between laws that are in the statute books and their
enforcement. Buscaglia and Stephan (2005) point out the gap between ‘law
in the books’ and ‘law in action’. They report empirical evidence that the
most unprotected segments of population consider lack of legal information,
economic factors, fear of abuse of authority as well as corrupt practices as
main obstacles to access to justice. Also, there is a deficiency in every citizen’s
expectations about others’ compliance, which forms the foundation of the
rule of law.
Not surprisingly, loopholes that enable kidney sales in the developing
world also exist even in highly developed countries such as the United States.
Kates (2002) reports existence of an international transplant mafia based
in the former Soviet Union capitalizing on America’s organ-shortage crisis
by smuggling live donors into the country to sell their lungs and kidneys.
Also, the life-and-death dilemma creates serious ethical and legal problems
for medical staff. For instance doctors report that they cannot turn over
every rock looking for trouble before going ahead if the circumstances seem
reasonable. In cases when organ traffickers are faced with an investigation,
the accused always makes the donor pose as a relative of the recipient and
produces documents in support.
It is known that organs from executed prisoners in China are system-
atically used.4 Furthermore, most open or covert organ sales in developing
countries appear to involve voluntary sales of kidneys by poor farmers to
wealthier urban residents. Thus, it is straightforward to detect the magnify-
ing role of inequality apart from the key role of ‘lack of rule of law’ in raising
the commercial live-donor transplants in many developing countries.
Evidence from Iran and the Philippines suggests that it is generally the poor who sell their
kidneys.
4A report in October 2000 in the Yangcheng Evening News said that middlemen post
advertisements on China’s auction Web sites.
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Inequality and weak institutions can decrease cadaveric donations through
another channel as well. To gain access to the waiting list, a patient must
demonstrate the ability to pay transplant-associated costs, which are rather
high. Many insurance companies and government programs do not cover
these costs fully; this situation is worse for less-than-wealthy individuals in
countries with weaker institutions which also manifest themselves in rather
low levels of collective action. Since cadaveric transplantation mainly de-
pends on public altruism to make organs available, in an unequal society
with weak institutions it may not be a reassuring public policy to ask every-
one to donate but to give organs only to those who can afford to pay.
2.2 Religious Beliefs Affecting the Cadaveric Ratio
There are extreme differences in cadaveric kidney harvesting regarding the
religious beliefs of the societies. The ratio of cadaveric transplants to all
transplants among Islamic countries, though may be as low as nil, is generally
positive yet significantly lower than those countries where the prevalent belief
is Christianity.
In the Middle East, religious precepts discourage, if not prohibit, cadav-
eric organ donation. Islamic teachings strongly emphasize the need to main-
tain the integrity of the body at burial (the body is considered the cover that
needs to protect the invaluable soul); although many religious leaders have
approved organ donation as a gift of life, others continue to object to it (see
Rothman et al., 1997).
Israelis, in contrast, reject the principle of brain death (equating it with
murder), thereby making organ retrieval almost impossible. Paying for an
organ has become common in Israel that there have been instances in which
a patient has elected not to accept the offer of a kidney donation from a
well-matched relative. Finkel (2001) reports an Israeli patient claiming why
one should risk harm to a family member while it is possible to purchase a
kidney from someone who is impoverished and living in a foreign land.
3 Data
We obtained data on cadaveric and live kidney transplants from the Inter-
national Registry Organ Donation Transplantation database for 63 coun-
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tries over the period 1998–2002.5 The data include Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia
and Turkey with Islam, and Israel with Judaism and Islam as the prominent
religious beliefs. For the remaining countries, Christianity is the dominant re-
ligion.6 For each country, we extract PPP adjusted GDP (calculated at 1995
prices in US dollars) from the World Development Indicators and popula-
tion data from the US census bureau IBD database. Information on income
inequality (Gini) is obtained from the World Income Inequality Database.
Data on rule of law (ROL) are constructed merging the indices provided by
Knack and Keefer(1995) and Kraay, Kaufmann and Mastruzzi (2005), which
are accessible through the World Bank databases.
Table 1, Panel A shows that the average number of live transplants is
approximately 245 and that of cadaveric transplants is 494. If one were to
concentrate on B countries where beliefs generally disapproves of the use
of organ transplants, the annual average number of live transplants would
shoot up to 362 cases and that of cadaveric kidney transplants would drop to
a dismal 57 cases a year. If we look at the remaining countries, on average,
cadaveric kidney transplants dominate that of live transplants by 564 to 226
cases.
Panel B provides basic statistics on the remaining variables of interest.
The average Gini index is 38 for the sample that excludes B countries and
41 for the B countries, indicating that on average inequality is higher in B
countries. Average per capita income is lower and rule of law is weaker in B
countries in comparison to the remaining countries.
3.1 Empirical Analysis
Given Gini and ROL indices do not change much over time, we construct
5-year averages and implement the following model to explore the impact of
religion, rule of law and inequality for low- and high-income countries on the
cadaveric to live kidney transplant ratio.
5See www.tpm.org/registry/reg mondo.asp.
6Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece,
Hong Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia,
Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, UK, USA, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela.
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CR = α0+α1Belief+γ1GDP+β1GiniLow+β2GiniHigh+η1ROLLow+η2ROLHigh+,
(1)
where CR denotes the cadaveric to total kidney transplants ratio. Belief is a
dummy which takes 1 for B countries where belief system traditionally does
not approve the use of cadaveric organs transplant. A country is placed in
the low (high) income group if her GDP per capita is below (above) the 40th
percentile for each year. Hence, this split can allow us to see the significance
of inequality and rule of law in relation to CR for low and high income
countries.7 In all models, we report robust standard errors.
Column 1 in Table 2 shows that Gini and ROL play an important role
for the low income countries: the Gini40 coefficient takes a negative sign and
the ROL40 coefficient takes a positive sign implying that improvements in
equality and rule of law would lead to an increase in the CR ratio. The same
coefficients for high-income countries (Gini60 and ROL60) are insignificant.
This finding is not too surprising as the ‘cadaveric kidney’ to ‘live-kidney
ratio’ for developed countries is high to start with. Interestingly, belief takes
a negative coefficient signalling the low harvesting of cadaveric kidney trans-
plantations in B countries. Finally, income does not play a significant role;
splitting income into low and high categories does not make a difference,
either.8
To gauge the robustness of our findings, in columns 2-4 we tabulate our
results incorporating per capita data on public, private, total medical ex-
penses into the initial model. In column 5, we introduce per capita public
and private medical expenses simultaneously. In all cases results are similar
to that in column 1; along with religion, Gini and ROL play an important
role for the low income countries. Finally, in column 6, we keep the structure
of the model as in column 5 but remove Israel from data. This omission does
not alter our findings. Overall, these results confirm and support the claim
that improvements in equality as well as rule of law could lead to higher use
of cadaveric kidney transplants.9
7The 40-60 split provides a sharper categorization between income groups in comparison
to splitting the data using the mean GDP figures. Results for the mean split are similar
to those we report and are available from the authors.
8We have allowed GDP40 and GDP60 in the regressions but their coefficients were
never significant.
9We carry out a similar exercise computing 3-year averages as well. Results from this
set is similar to those we report here and available from the authors upon request.
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4 Concluding Remarks
Increases in cadaveric kidney harvesting can keep the waiting list under con-
trol as kidney transplantation is the preferred treatment method due to its
cost effectiveness and the quality of life that the patient enjoys afterwards.
Our findings based on information from 63 countries over 1998–2002, not dis-
counting other potential policy changes, suggest that the ratio of cadaveric to
total kidney transplants can increase by implementing policies which improve
rule of law and equality. Our findings also suggest that, in countries where
the predominant religion is Islam (and Judaism), governments and health or-
ganizations should work in tandem and encourage people to use and donate
cadaveric kidneys as it may take decades to change the established norms
which are imbedded in the fabric of the society.
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Table 1: Basic descriptive statistics  
Panel A 
 Full Sample B countries Full Sample less B 
 
Live Transp. 
Cadaveric 
Transp Live Transp. 
Cadaveric 
Transp Live Transp. 
Cadaveric 
Transp 
Average 245 494 362 57 226 564 
Std. dev 786 1238 508 50 822 1321 
Min 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Max 6178 8938 1585 189 6178 8938 
N 246 246 34 34 212 212 
 
 
 
Panel B 
 Full Sample B countries Full Sample less B 
 Gini  ROL  GDP  Gini  ROL  GDP  Gini  ROL  GDP  
Average 38 4 15848 41 3 10011 38 4 16797 
Std. dev 9 1 9784 4 1 5815 9 1 9977 
Min 23 2 1143 31 2 1502 23 2 1143 
Max 61 6 53385 47 4 20339 61 6 53385 
N 237 253 243 21 34 34 216 219 209 
Notes: B countries are Turkey, Bahrain, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Iran, Egypt, Bangladesh and Israel. 
 
 
 
Table 2.    Results using 5-year averages                
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Mgdp 
0.001 
[0.07] 
-0.000 
[0.009] 
0.001 
[0.007] 
-0.000 
[0.008] 
-0.000 
[0.007] 
0.000 
[0.007] 
Mgini40 
 
-0.015 
[0.006]** 
-0.013 
[0.006]** 
-0.013 
[0.007]* 
-0.014 
[0.006]** 
-0.011 
[0.006]* 
-0.012 
[0.006]* 
Mgini60 
 
0.004 
[0.007] 
-0.005 
[0.007] 
0.008 
[0.008] 
0.005 
[0.008] 
0.009 
[0.008] 
0.007 
[0.008] 
Mrol40 
 
0.168 
[0.087]* 
0.165 
[0.089]* 
0.189 
[0.090]** 
0.179 
[0.090]* 
0.178 
[0.091]* 
0.184 
[0.090]** 
Mrol60 
 
-0.025 
[0.064] 
-0.023 
[0.074] 
-0.017 
[0.064] 
-0.016 
[0.071] 
-0.024 
[0.069] 
-0.017 
[0.067] 
Public health 
expense 
- 0.019 
[0.027] 
- - 0.019 
[0.029] 
0.013 
[0.030] 
Private health 
expense 
- - 0.028 
[0.077] 
- -0.028 
[-1.00] 
-0.028 
[0.027] 
Total health 
expense 
- - - -0.003 
[0.023] 
- - 
Belief 
 
-0.444 
[0. 101]*** 
-0.417 
[0.103]*** 
-0.439 
[0.097]*** 
-0.444 
[0.106]*** 
-4.14 
[0.101]*** 
-0.463 
[0.121]*** 
R-squared 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.51 
N 54 50 50 50 50 49 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% .  Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis.               
 
